Nuclear Threat : A Genuine Threat to Indian Civilization

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• Nuclear Diplomacy : A Game to Gain Time ? 10/04 02:59pm Msgs: 15

• Pakistani Agent Posing As Indian Muslim & Hindu 11/08 07:36am Msgs: 40

• Pakistan : The Truth The Future The India Pakistan Myth The Kashmir - ONLY for Adults   Msgs: -

• Nuclear Threat : A Genuine Threat .. Vol 1-3 10/04 02:08pm Msgs: 20

• Archive through February 12, 2003 02/12 09:34am Msgs: 34

responding to the pakistani nuclear threat the fella who posted the thread seems to appear a little paranoid so pakistan has nuclear weapons boo hoo anybody knows that to use nuclear weapons is MAD( mutual assured distruction).The only country ever to use them on people was the US who to show a sign of there strength killed hundreds of thousands.

To respond to his arguements that islamic zealots have been destroying indian civilisation for centuries is a joke.You don't need our help -u do a perfectley fine job yourself, ask any sane historian and he will tell u in general what a positive impact islam had on the region.To mention hindu facism today
resembles that of nazism ,to the golden age many backward indians portray check out your history its all a fairy story-you know the term hindu was a colonial expression,enough said about your pic & mix religion, the descrimination caste system realy something to inspire people i guess not.

There are bad eggs in every religion but anyone who says islam is evil is ignorant ,i suggest those who express this opinon have a open mind learn what the religion teaches at least then u will no what your talking about!

By Anonymous on Sunday, August 27, 2006 - 12:12 pm:

The fact that Saudi and Pakistan may be working on a nuclear programme is the joke of the decade! I mean give me a break guys! If Saudi had such nationalist designs, they wouldn't be American corporations' toy puppets today. When the Iraqi army was moving into Kuwait the Saudis didn't even bother putting up resistance. Instead, their leaders were drinking johnnie walker blue label whiskey in some 5 star hotel. The only thing their "brains" were capable of doing is calling the Americans for help. Eventhough Saudi has F-15s and M1A1 tanks in its arsenal! With their resource endowments they can be a world power which could rival NATO and Warsaw Pact but they're just a bunch of muppets. Which just goes to prove a nuclear programme is beyond the reach of the brains of the Saudi establishment...

Also, regarding who's a "nuclear threat"- I don't mix my head up unnecessarily. I view those who've actually used nuclear / atomic weapons in combat at some point as the greatest nuclear threat today. A person who has killed in the past is more likely to kill again than a person who hasn't killed anyone. Same goes w/ countries because countries are nothing but entities comprising of mankind. SO what applies to human psychology also applies to countries' collective psyches.

So go figure who's the world's #1 nuclear threat...

By Anonymous on Sunday, August 13, 2006 - 05:42 am:

Saudis, with Pakistani help, working on nuclear programme

AFP

Thursday, March 30 2006


Nuclear ProliferationSaudi Arabia is working secretly on a nuclear programme, with help from Pakistani experts, a German magazine reports in its latest edition, citing Western security sources. The German magazine Cicero says that during the Hajj pilgrimages to Mecca in 2003 through 2005, Pakistani scientists posed as pilgrims to come to Saudi Arabia in aircraft laid on by the oil-rich kingdom. Between October 2004 and January 2005, some of them took the opportunity to "disappear" from their hotel rooms, sometimes for up to three weeks, it quoted German security expert Udo Ulfkotte as saying.

According to Western security services, the magazine added, Saudi scientists have been working since the mid-1990s in Pakistan, a nuclear power since 1998 thanks to the work of the now-disgraced Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Cicero, which will appear on newstands on Thursday, also quoted a US military analyst, John Pike, as saying that Saudi bar codes can be found on half of Pakistan's nuclear weapons "because it is Saudi Arabia which ultimately co-financed the Pakistani atomic nuclear programme". The magazine also said satellite images prove that Saudi Arabia has set up in Al-Sulaiyil, south of Riyadh, a secret underground city and dozens of underground silos for missiles. According to some Western security services, long-range Ghauri-type missiles of Pakistani-origin are housed inside the silos.

By Anonymous on Sunday, August 13, 2006 - 05:28 am:

Pakistan’s Nuclear Money Trail
There have been many contradictory reports about Pakistan’s nuclear program both leading up to and following the bizarre confession by Pakistani nuclear figure Dr.A.Q.Khan and his subsequent pardon by Gen.Musharraf. In this context, one can infer interesting conclusions by following the money trail and correlating it with the involvement of foreign nations or persons in the Pakistani nuclear program.

Zulfiqar Bhutto, who was then prime minister, initiated Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program at a meeting of high-level military and civil bureaucrats and scientists in the city of Multan on January 20 1972. Needing financial support, Bhutto openly propounded the need for the “Islamic civilization” to possess nuclear weapons since the Christian and Jewish societies already had it. Bhutto went on tour to the oil rich Arab nations, challenging their rulers to demonstrate their Islamic solidarity.

Bhutto immediately won pledges of support from three rich Islamic states – Iran, Saudi Arabia and Libya. Under the patronage of Saudi King Faisal, Bhutto hosted the 1974 Islamic Summit in Lahore, Pakistan. It was here that Bhutto and Libyan dictator Colonel Muammar Qaddafi sealed a deal by which Libya would contribute substantial sums of money to Pakistan’s nuclear program in return for Pakistani transfer of nuclear know-how at a future date. Bhutto even arranged for Qaddafi to tour Pakistan’s new Canadian built nuclear reactor in Karachi guided by the long term chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Munir Khan, who some say was the real “father” of Pakistan’s bomb.

Mohammed Beg, former European Director for Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and Bhutto confidante later revealed that Libyan dictator Colonel Muammar Qaddafi personally supervised transfers of suitcases filled with US Dollars to Pakistan on PIA flights, sometimes up to $100 million in a single flight. Saudi King Faisal also generously contributed funds to Pakistan’s nuclear program during this time. Bhutto’s indebtedness to these two leaders was made clear when he named the largest Cricket Stadium in Pakistan after Qaddafi and renamed the old Colonial city of Lyallpur as Faisalabad, in honor of King Faisal. In the year following the deal with Libya, Bhutto convinced the Shah of Iran to contribute up to $500 million, ostensibly for crushing a Baloch rebellion near Pakistan’s Iran border, but widely believed to be earmarked for the nuclear program. Put together, the Islamic contribution to Pakistan’s atomic program reached many billions by the late 1970s.

After dictator General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew and later executed Bhutto in 1979, the Pakistani military took firm control of the nuclear program. Thanks to the Afghan jihad, Pakistan was by then swimming in cash, both due to direct aid from the US as well as contributions from the Saudis. However, despite ambitious goals, Pakistan lacked the scientific base needed for the many thousands of sophisticated components needed for a nuclear weapons program. But by leveraging his European contacts, A.Q.Khan set up a network, supervised by the Pakistan Army’s Special Works Organization as well as the sinister spy agency, the ISI, which could acquire virtually any desired item from Western European nations as well as the US and Canada to a lesser extent. During this time, failed Bank of Credit and Commerce International played a critical role in financing this Pakistani nuclear smuggling ring. In 1992, a report into from a US Congressional sub-committee headed by Senator John Kerry, said that there was “good reason to conclude that BCCI did finance Pakistan's nuclear program.

By the late 1980s Pakistan had acquired the ability to make an atomic device as well as the nuclear fuel needed for it. It was time for the lenders to come calling for a return on investment. Iran was the first to approach Pakistan. Then Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg openly called for a Pakistan-Iran strategic alliance that included nuclear co-operation. An aide to then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif recently revealed that Gen. Beg and a senior Iranian military official met with Mr. Sharif and informed him of a deal to sell nuclear technology to Iran for an additional $12 billion. We now know that Pakistan did transfer nuclear technology to Iran around this time. We also know that sometime later, Libya also approached Pakistan and obtained nuclear technology for further cash transfers to the tune of more than $100 million.

Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto recently mentioned in an interview that she had sanctioned the purchase of ballistic missile technology from North Korea. Western analysts now believe that Pakistan transferred nuclear technology to North Korea in return for the missiles since it lacked foreign exchange during the mid 1990s. The recent Saudi connection is also important. After Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, Saudi Arabia provided almost a billion dollars worth of free oil supplies to Pakistan every year. In 1999, Saudi Defense minister Prince Sultan became one of the few foreigners to tour secret Pakistani nuclear facilities - places were even former elected Pakistani Prime Ministers weren’t welcome. Arnaud de Borchgrave recently broke a story on a secret Pakistan-Saudi deal on nukes. Interestingly, the Saudi oil facility was stopped right after that report and there are now talks of a large Pakistan army contingent moving to Saudi Arabia - both possible signs of a deal clinched.

Another pointer to the financial aspect of Pakistan’s proliferation was revealed in 2000, when the Pakistan commerce ministry issued advertisements in prominent English language Pakistani papers announcing intended sale of enriched uranium, plutonium and 17 types of equipment, including nuclear power reactors, reactor control systems and many other similar technology. Days after this, the Pakistan government withdrew the ads and said that it was a “mistake”. Despite this Gen. Beg commented that selling “surplus” nuclear material to fellow Islamic nations was a "respectable way of earning money."

The bottom line is that an analysis of the money trail shows that the drivers behind Pakistani nuclear proliferation were essentially that of a state and not some rogue individuals. Even though A.Q.Khan and some of his assistants may have had a major role in the nuclear network, the Pakistani Army essentially supervised it. That oversight is not dependent on whether goods were coming in or going out of Pakistan. As the 2000 advertisement saga shows, Pakistan government was seriously pursuing the usage of its nuclear technology as a tradable commodity. The huge sums of money involved also point to state involvement. Given this, it would not be possible to break this nuclear network without bringing to account the various Pakistani state entities, overt and covert, and their representatives abroad. Unfortunately, by buying Gen.Musharraf’s incredulous claims of no state involvement and focusing on A.Q.Khan, the US and its allies are ensuring that the nuclear network remains alive, albeit more underground.

By Anonymous on Sunday, August 13, 2006 - 05:27 am:

A poll on a major security site:


Which countries belong on the 'axis of evil'?
China 790 (4.72)%
Iran 728 (4.35)%
Iraq 592 (3.54)%
North Korea 2049 (12.24)%
Pakistan 11303 (67.50)%
Saudi Arabia 962 (5.75)%
Sudan 320 (1.91)%

By Anonymous on Sunday, August 13, 2006 - 05:25 am:

Pakistan-North Korea Connection Creates Huge Dilemma For U.S.
John E. Carbaugh, Jr

U.S. government officials were taken aback last October when officials in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) admitted during high level bilateral talks that the country is pursuing a uranium enrichment nuclear program-a violation of four international agreements. Since then, tensions between Washington and Pyongyang have risen steadily, as the Bush Administration works quietly but decidedly to organize international pressure on Pyongyang to end its nuclear weapons program.

Given the prominence that North Korea's nuclear program has achieved in U.S. foreign policy, it is a little odd that Pakistan-which U.S. intelligence agencies are convinced supplied North Korea with technology to pursue its nuclear program-has thus escaped high-level pressure from Washington.

Major Diplomatic Headache
Pakistan has become a major diplomatic headache for the Bush Administration. On the one hand, Pakistan is a crucial ally in the war against terrorism. Many analysts suspect Osama Bin Laden is now hiding somewhere in Pakistan; cooperation from Pakistani security and intelligence officials is needed to capture Osama and cut the power of Al Qaeda. On the other hand, Pakistan's ties to North Korea's nuclear program have violated bilateral assurances to the U.S. Pakistan's actions also have facilitated a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (North Korea is a signatory) to violate its commitments.

In the view of some analysts, Pakistan is "double-dealing" with the U.S., claiming to work together in the war against terrorism while maintaining ties with North Korea of the sort that essentially facilitated the current nuclear tension on the Korea Peninsula. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks the U.S. invested a lot of political capital to cultivate improved ties with Pakistan. The U.S. waived all economic sanctions against Pakistan in return for Pakistani cooperation in the war against terrorism. Now President George W. Bush has his hands tied. The U.S. government has doggedly worked to stem the proliferation of nuclear (as well as chemical and biological) weapons to hostile and unstable countries.

What should be its priority now: punishing Pakistan for its proliferation policies or pursuing the war against terrorism? U.S. officials have a hard time answering a basic question: Why tolerate Pakistani proliferation and possession of nuclear weapons, yet take such a hard line against North Korea for following a similar path?

Pakistan's Denials
The Pakistanis deny exporting nuclear technology to North Korea. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, insists that Pakistan is innocent. During a trip to Tampa in October he responded to these allegations in the St. Petersburg Times, "It is simply not true. [Pakistan] has a track record on nuclear export controls that nobody has challenged." But U.S. intelligence officials are fully convinced that Pakistan supplied North Korea with crucial technology needed to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has been reluctant to release the full facts, both to protect intelligence sources and to forestall a backlash on Capitol Hill against the Pakistani regime. But a steady flow of leaks from U.S. intelligence agencies to the news media have had the effect of giving a warning to Pakistan that it better back off from its nuclear ties with North Korea.

Long Term Ties
Although the extent of Pakistani-North Korean contacts remains somewhat cloudy, it is clear that they have existed for some time. The military relationship between North Korea and Pakistan-from which the nuclear connection eventually emerged-began during the 1970s, when then-Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto began expanding bilateral ties with Pyongyang. The relationship got a big boost after a day trip to Pyongyang 20 years later by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The 1993 discussions between Bhutto and North Korean officials were ostensibly about economic relations. Most analysts believe that Ms. Bhutto also went to Pyongyang to discuss the purchase of ballistic missiles from North Korea, a deal that was finally signed in 1995.

Pakistan's motive was to keep pace with India's development of nuclear weapons. Pakistan had nuclear warheads at the time but was desperately seeking a delivery system. Because of its weak economic position and the extended length of time required to build up a missile program, Pakistan ruled out indigenous development.

Initial Help from China
Initially, it sought help from China, which sold Pakistan 34 M-11 short-range missiles in the early 1990s. Continued purchase of missiles from China proved difficult, however, because of strong U.S. opposition. Pakistan was still determined to obtain longer-range missiles that would enable it to target, strategically, all of India. So, Pakistan scouted out the potential of North Korea's Nodong missile. Numerous personnel visits are believed to have taken place between North Korea and Pakistan during the 1990s. In a paper for the Center for Nonproliferation Studies entitled, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Joseph Bermudez, Jr. writes that the first of these visits took place in August, 1992, when Pakistani officials journeyed to North Korea to examine the Nodong.

"The DPRK Deputy Premier-Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam traveled to.Pakistan to discuss a number of issues, including missile cooperation and DPRK sales of Hwasong 6 and possibly Nodong missiles. Pakistani and Iranian specialists are believed to have been present for the DPRK's May 29-30, 1993, tests," Bermudez says. Shortly thereafter, Pakistan established a ballistic missile project to purchase and manufacture the Nodong missile. Pakistanis called it the Ghauri. The spring of 1996 saw the delivery of missiles by Changgwang Sinyong Corp.-North Korea's marketing arm for missile production facilities-to Pakistan, most of which went to A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories. Pakistan tested the Ghauri in April, 1998, for the first time; North Korean observers apparently were present.

Although Pakistan now admits buying missiles from North Korea, it initially denied it. Few analysts were fooled about the missiles' origin. Gaurav Kampani, a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute's Center of Nonproliferation Studies notes some telling clues: "If you look at the history of missile development in any country," Kampani says, "it's really a one or two decade long process. Pakistan is probably one of the only cases where it has no history of testing or development and all of a sudden it displays a fully developed ballistic missile. Then it tests it over an urban center. That degree of confidence suggests that a tested, reliable weapon system has been procured. "Second, there is no doubt that the missile is the Nodong in external appearance, range, and warhead payload," Kampani continues. "Third, North Korean crews were present during the launch in Pakistan, and there was a lot of air freight traffic between North Korea and Pakistan before the launch. Fourth, the U.S. State Department sanctioned the Khan Research Labs and the North Korean entity from which the missiles were supplied."

According to the Arms Control Association, Pakistan has produced three versions of the Nodong. The Ghauri-1, with a range of 1,300+ km and a payload of 700kg; the Ghauri-2, with a much longer range of 2,300 km and a payload of 700kg; and the Ghauri-3, which is untested, but expected to have a range of 3,000km. The Nodong is not the only model procured. Bermudez notes, "[The Pakistani 2,000km range Ghaznavi] missile may actually be a Taepodong-1."

Nuclear Barter
That Pakistan obtained ballistic missiles from North Korea is not in question. U.S., British, and South Korean intelligence officials have long wondered how Pakistan would repay the debt. The answer seems to be: by providing North Korea with enrichment technology. It is unclear whether Pakistan originally agreed to supply nuclear technology in exchange for ballistic missiles. Purportedly, the original arrangement was that Pakistan would pay in cash. But missiles are expensive; by the time they were delivered by North Korea in the spring of 1996, Pakistan's economic situation had deteriorated badly. It was dependent on bailouts by the International Monetary Fund. (As a point of reference, in 1999 North Korea asked million for Taepodong missiles.)

Intelligence officials now believe that Pakistan decided to transfer nuclear technology as a means of payment. This barter proved to be a perfect match. In 1994, the North Koreans signed the Agreed Framework, in which they agreed to shut down their plutonium-based nuclear program. But North Korean scientists found Pakistan's uranium enrichment technology to be a good means of continuing a covert nuclear program, albeit one that requires time.

"Early Warning to Congress"
U.S. government officials said recently that they have suspected North Korea has been pursuing a uranium enrichment program for at least two years. Larry Niksch, Senior Asia Specialist at the Congressional Research Service and the leading expert on North Korea in Congress, summarized the clues that led U.S. officials to make this assessment. In a briefing to Congress in November, Niksch told Congressional Leaders that "In March, 2000, President Clinton notified Congress that he could not certify that North Korea was not acquiring enriched uranium for the production of nuclear weapons." The Japanese newspaper, Sankei Shimbun, reported on June 9th, 2000, the contents of a "detailed report" from Chinese government sources on a secret North Korean uranium enrichment facility inside North Korea's Mount Chonma.

"In May, 2002, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton cited a U.S. intelligence estimate of December, 2001, in accusing North Korea of operating a secret nuclear program," Niksch wrote. U.S. officials say they confirmed beyond doubt the existence of North Korea's program last July. "It was like the Rosetta Stone," Niksch said. "Once we had that, we knew what was going on." President Bush ordered the intelligence community to review the assessment once again, to make absolutely sure it was correct. The various U.S. intelligence agencies are in full agreement. Confirmation of the Pakistan connection apparently emerged at the same time. One report among intelligence circles is that British Intelligence was able to obtain from the Pakistani Embassy in London crucial information about the Pakistan-North Korea connection.

According to Kampani, some big clues have been leaked to the press:

First, some retired Pakistani officials have tracked questionable shipments to North Korea that may have been centrifuge uranium enrichment technology.

Second, some Indian defense officials have named the private airline associated with the Pakistani Interservice Intelligence Division that was used to transport equipment to North Korea.

Third, the centrifuge designs that North Korea is using are startlingly similar to what is used in Pakistan. How could the North Koreans, who had no experience or background in uranium centrifuge enrichment, suddenly develop one within four years? Export regulations are very tight; if a massive clandestine procurement program were to be undertaken by North Korea, it would be visible to the international community. Pakistan was the only nuclear power with the means and the motive to help North Korea.

Despite the apparent evidence, Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf, in a discussion with Secretary of State Colin Powell, denied any involvement in North Korea's nuclear program. Powell told reporters, "[Musharraf] said, 'Four hundred percent assurance that there is no such interchange taking place now.'" It is telling, however, that Powell reported that the two had not discussed the past, and he would not discuss it because it would shed light on how the U.S. government collects evidence.

Rogue Scientists?
Some analysts suspect that the transfer of nuclear technology can be attributed to rogue elements within Pakistan, in particular one man: Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founding father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. A household name in Pakistan, A.Q. Khan substantially advanced Pakistan's uranium enrichment program in the 1970's, and thus the capability to build nuclear weapons. The fissile material for the initial Pakistani nuclear weapons apparently came from A.Q. Khan's labs. As head of the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories, Khan was always in fierce competition with colleagues at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Agency. Some analysts believe that the intense rivalry led Khan to act independently of the Pakistani government to purchase delivery systems from abroad for nuclear weapons systems.

Thus, if there were a rogue element in Pakistan, Khan would be the likely suspect. Khan is often described as a flamboyant, egomaniacal scientist who claims credit for much more than he deserves. He is also famous for having pilfered from the Netherlands both the designs used to build Pakistan's uranium enrichment gas-centrifuge plants, and also the lists of manufacturers of components of nuclear technology in the U.S. and Europe. With this knowledge he was able to exploit export regulations in the early 1970's and import materials into Pakistan. After graduating from school in Karachi, Khan went to Europe in 1961 to continue his studies, ultimately earning a doctorate in metallurgy. Khan accepted a position with the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory (FDO), a subcontractor for Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN), the Dutch partner of URENCO, a tri-national European uranium enrichment centrifuge consortium.

In 1974, Khan was asked to translate highly classified design documents for the world's most advanced industrial enrichment technology at that time-something which he dutifully did while taking copious notes. In 1976, Khan suddenly left the Netherlands under suspicious circumstances. Later, Khan turned up in Pakistan, where he founded Engineering Research Laboratories, subsequently renamed the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). Then-Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave Khan control of the country's budding uranium enrichment program. The Dutch government later convicted Khan in abstentia for stealing classified plans and technology from URENCO.

The Khan Research Laboratory is home to both a missile-development center and an industrial sized gas-centrifuge plant for enriching uranium. Most of the ballistic missiles Pakistan purchased from North Korea were delivered to KRL. It is probably not coincidental, then, that Khan has reportedly made as many as 13 trips to North Korea.

Pakistani Government "Approval"
Still, most analysts dismiss the suggestion that Khan acted independently of the government. Gaurav Kampani said, "On the one hand you have the Pakistani government reiterating consistently that they have multiple controls of their nuclear materials and weapons. But then they insinuate that it was done by A.Q. Khan. Pakistan's nuclear scientists don't have the degree of autonomy to make independent decisions like this; they are subject to Pakistan's National Command Authority." That is not is not to say, however, that Khan can't make trouble.

Some analysts wonder if there is a story behind his resignation last year. The High Energy Weapons Archive website reports: "A. Q. Khan's official career came to an abrupt end in March, 2001, when he [was] suddenly retired by order of President Pervez Musharraf. It may be that Musharraf, who was busy mending fences with the outside world, wished to tie down some loose cannons that were a source of irritation with India and the United States." Others suspect that Khan is still involved with North Korea's nuclear project. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage expressed concern on June 1st, 2001, in an article which appeared in the Financial Times, stating that, "people who were employed by the nuclear agency and have retired" may be assisting North Korea with its nuclear program. Armitage's comments are believed to refer to Khan.

Khan is now a "Special Adviser" to the Musharraf on Strategic and KRL Affairs. The likelihood of a rogue military element is also dubious. Pakistan's National Command Authority is comprised of three divisions: the Weapons Development Control Committee, the Weapons Employment Control Committee, and the Strategic Plans Division, which acts as a secretariat to the other two. The Weapons Development Control Committee is comprised of all the top military brass and the relevant scientific organizations, which includes the nuclear bureaucracies, while the head of Pakistan's government is supposed to chair the Weapons Employment Committee. "The Pakistani military really calls the shots as far as the nuclear program is concerned," Kampani said. "But it's hard to imagine that something could have happened without the tacit consent of the Prime Minister."

Strategic Leaks
The clinching evidence-the "Rosetta Stone" referred to earlier-about North Korea's enrichment program emerged last summer when U.S. and other intelligence services found North Korea trying to acquire large amounts of high-strength aluminum. The metal is used in equipment to enrich uranium to make nuclear bombs. This assessment was confirmed when Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited Pyongyang in early October and confronted North Korean officials with the information. North Korea admitted to the charge.

U.S. officials then fingered Pakistan as a supplier of parts and expertise to North Korea's uranium enrichment gas-centrifuge program. But U.S. suspicions had been around for quite some time. In October, 2001, the Washington Times reported the contents of a classified 1999 Energy Department Report which said that North Korea had undertaken a uranium enrichment nuclear project. It pointed to an attempt by a North Korean company to buy frequency converters from a Japanese company. According to the report, this equipment is "almost certainly for use in a gas-centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium." According to Bill Gertz, the Washington Times correspondent, the report specifically identifies Pakistan as a possible collaborator in North Korea's nuclear development. "Pakistan may well have lent some level of assistance on uranium enrichment," the report said. It surmises that North Korea is at least six years from the production of highly-enriched uranium, but warns that "with significant technical support from other countries, such as Pakistan, the time frame could be decreased by several years."

Strategic Silence
Why is the U.S. going so easy on Pakistan? The most obvious explanation is that Pakistan is a crucial ally in America's war against terrorism. As a neighbor of Afghanistan, Pakistan has been a central staging area for the Bush Administration's efforts to overthow the Taliban and rout out Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda ringleaders hiding there. President Musharraf's support has been key in pursuing terrorists as they flee Afghanistan, especially to anti-Western, radical Muslim communities in Pakistan. The U.S. cannot afford to lose Pakistan's cooperation.

There are some Bush Administration officials who cite another explanation. It is simply too dangerous to alienate Pakistan. It is a possessor of nuclear weapons, but it also is the most politically unstable of all nuclear powers. It is economically bankrupt, and a home to rising Islamic fundamentalism. Given the right circumstances, Pakistan could proliferate nuclear weapons to other entities hostile to the U.S., including international terrorists. "There is enormous concern that if Pakistan became a failed state it would be a total disaster," Kampani said. "The U.S. obviously wants to see to it that Musharraf is able to reform Pakistan. They realize that it was because of its isolation, economic situation, and sense of strategic paranoia during the 1990s that Pakistan did what it did with North Korea; it could do it again if faced with similar situation." Can Musharaf-"one bullet away from eternity," as one observer described Musharaf's current dilema-make such reforms?

Indeed, there are many would-be buyers out there. Saudi Arabia, for one. Saudi Arabia is believed to have funded part of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Last year the Saudi defense minister was given a tour of the centrifuge uranium enrichment labs, which raised eyebrows among U.S. officials. It seems to be the case, then, that the U.S. is protecting Pakistan. The news leaks suggest that the U.S. government has stumbled upon evidence and is warning Pakistan publicly. But the leaks stop short of incriminating it to the extent that Congress and the U.S. public would demand that the U.S. government come down on Pakistan.

Watching Closely
Colin Powell has warned Musharraf that the U.S. will not tolerate any further exchanges, and that it will be keeping a close eye on Pakistan's activities hereafter. Optimists believe-hope-that it now appears likely that Pakistan will curtail its nuclear trade with North Korea, at least for now. First, Musharraf's comments to Powell suggest that this summer's transfers may have completed the North Korean-Pakistan nuclear barter arrangement.

Second, if it didn't before, Pakistan now understands that continuing nuclear transfers to North Korea (or elsewhere) will bring them into direct confrontation with the U.S. Third, Pakistan's political credibility would be destroyed. This could compromise crucial international aid, for which, incidentally, Japan is the second largest donor.

But given Pakistan's instability, the situation will have to be watched closely.


Feedback

When, not if, the Islamic bomb is used agianst USA/UK, it will have its origins in Pakistan. I will be the first to say serves you jolly well right for ignoring Pakistan's terrorism against India and its links with Taliban and al Qaida, which are well known but given the blind eye by the USA/UK that continue to indulge this rogue state.
S.Choudhry
Germany

The lax American attitude towards Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities is nothing short of criminal. It blows my mind that Pakistan sells nuke technology to the North Koreans, who will deploy it against US military personnel in East Asia or maybe in ballistic missiles aimed at the American west coast - and we do nothing. As a matter of fact we send them oodles of taxpayer money. Well, this taxpayer is truly disgusted.
J.Jones
USA

"Even North Korea is less dangerous than Pakistan?a Stalinist country with a defunct ideology and a bomb is infinitely less dangerous than a country with a bomb and a new ideology in the full vigor of its first birth. That is the real nexus of the terrorism, and fussing in the desert doesn?t even begin to address it."
B.H. Levy
?Qui A Tué Daniel Pearl?? ("Who Killed Daniel Pearl?")

Despite repeated warnings by Indian experts about the evil nexus between Islamic fundamentalism and Communistic dogma, the egoistic western strategists have ignored the real threats before the civilised world. The western states have found it handy to oil the authoritarian alliance so that they can rule over the democratic lifestyle of the global community. Now they are on a threshold to pay the price for this greed. God grinds slowly but exceedingly fine.
S. K. Bose
India

By Anonymous on Sunday, August 13, 2006 - 05:24 am:

he Wrath of Khan

October 02 2005

Nuclear ProliferationWilliam Langewiesche - How A. Q. Khan made Pakistan a nuclear power—and showed that the spread of atomic weapons can't be stopped
R awalpindi is a city of two million residents on the northern plains of the Punjab, in Pakistan. It is a teeming place, choked with smoke and overcrowded with people just barely getting by. A large number of them live hand to mouth on the equivalent of a few hundred dollars a year. Much of their drinking water comes from a lake in the peaceful countryside north of town. The lake is surrounded by tree-lined pastures and patches of sparse forest. The navy of Pakistan has a sailing club there, on a promontory with a cinder-block shack, a dock, and one small sloop in the water—a Laser 16 with dirty sails, which sees little use. Though fishermen and picnickers sometimes appear in the afternoons or evenings, the lakefront on both sides of the promontory is pristine and undeveloped. The emptiness is by design: though the land around the lake is privately owned, zoning laws strictly forbid construction there, in order to protect Rawalpindi's citizens from the contamination that would otherwise result. This seems only right. If Pakistan can do nothing else for its people, it can at least prevent the rich from draining their sewage into the water of the poor.

But Pakistan is a country corrupted to its core, and some years ago a large weekend house was built in blatant disregard of the law, about a mile from the navy's sailing club, clearly in sight on the lake's far shore. When ordinary people build illegal houses in Pakistan, the government's response is unambiguous and swift: backed by soldiers or the police, bulldozers come in and knock the structures down. But the builder of this house was none other than Dr. Abdul Quadeer Khan, the metallurgist who after a stint in Europe had returned to Pakistan in the mid-1970s with stolen designs, and over the years had provided the country—single-handedly, it was widely believed—with an arsenal of nuclear weapons. Though he worked in the realm of state secrets, Khan had become something of a demigod in Pakistan, with a public reputation second only to that of the nation's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and he had developed an ego to match.

He was the head of a government facility named after him—the Khan Research Laboratories, or KRL—which had mastered the difficult process of producing highly enriched uranium, the fissionable material necessary for Pakistan's weapons, and was also involved in the design of the warheads and the missiles to deliver them. The enemy was India, where Khan, like most Pakistanis of his generation, had been born, and against which Pakistan has fought four losing wars since its birth, in 1947. India had the bomb, and now Pakistan did too. A. Q. Khan was seen to have assured the nation's survival, and indeed he probably has—up until the moment, someday in a conceivable future, when a nuclear exchange actually occurs.

Complete article from the Atlantic Monthly.

By Anonymous on Sunday, August 13, 2006 - 05:22 am:

Intelligence report claims nuclear market thriving

Sunday, January 08 2006

Nuclear ProliferationIan Traynor and Ian Cobain - European firms warned they are main target of illicit trade in weapons parts
It is intended as an alarm bell sounding in the boardrooms of western Europe's leading engineering companies as well as the common rooms of campuses and cutting-edge science labs. It is also a wake-up call to EU governments, spy agencies and customs officials struggling to keep the ingredients for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) out of the hands of some of the most unsavoury regimes in the Middle East and the far east. But if the 55-page confidential "early warning" intelligence assessment is impressive in the sheer mass of detail on the names and locations of suspect players in the global WMD game, the information may be seen as deeply troubling. It emphasises that west European engineering firms, germ laboratories, scientific thinktanks and university campuses are successfully preyed on by multitudes of middlemen, front companies, scholars with hidden agendas and bureaucrats working for the Iranian, Syrian or Pakistani regimes.

The report from a leading EU intelligence service obtained by the Guardian represent, it seems, the pooled knowledge of at least four major EU member-states on how countries such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea orchestrate a vast network of traders, phoney companies, state institutions and diplomatic missions internationally to procure the means to develop chemical, biological, nuclear and conventional weapons. Given the hi-tech nature of the coveted parts and materials, the west European marketplace is the principal shopping mall, while Russia and the former Soviet Union are targeted for talented if impoverished brainpower. The Iranians, for example, are using middlemen in the neighbouring and post-Soviet countries of Azerbaijan and Armenia to tap the post-Soviet market, the document states. Or the Pakistanis. The world's biggest clandestine nuclear proliferation racket, centred around the Pakistani metallurgist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, was exposed more than two years ago. Khan is under house arrest and several of his collaborators in Europe have been arrested in Germany, Switzerland and South Africa. Yet the business rolls on, according to the document almost from the moment Khan went on Pakistani television to "confess" in February 2004. "Since the beginning of 2004 extensive procurement efforts for the Pakistani nuclear sector have been registered."

Furthermore, the range of materials and components being bought "clearly exceeds" that required for spare parts and replacements in Islamabad's nuclear programme. That suggests the nuclear black market is trading on the surplus goods. The report notes, for example, that Khan's shopping sprees included high-grade aluminium tubing for the centrifuges that spin uranium into bomb fuel. He sold the pipes to Libya's Colonel Muammar Gadafy, who has since given them up. "The procurement efforts for such tubing were not halted after the uncovering of the procurement network." Khan's power base outside Islamabad, the Khan Research Laboratories (named after him), remain a central institution in the Pakistani nuclear programme, according to the document, served by an array of front companies who are past masters at disguising the real "end users" for the components and equipment they purchase in western Europe. While the Pakistani bomb project has long been realised, Iran's nuclear ambitions are not as advanced and have the makings of an international crisis. So it is not surprising that much of the document focuses on Iranian activities - not only in the nuclear field, but in bio-chemical and conventional weapons, notably its "very ambitious" missile programmes. The document lists more than 200 Iranian companies, institutes, government offices and academic outfits said to be engaged in weapons research, development and procurement, and mostly subordinate to the defence ministry in Tehran's armed forces logistics department.

Russia, which has just clinched a billion-dollar missile deal with Iran, is identified as crucial to Iran's military programmes, especially the missile development; 16 Russian companies and academic institutes are named as helping and profiting from the Iranian military effort. They range from the Glavkosmos space agency to St Petersburg's Technical University. The Iranians, as well as the Pakistanis and the Syrians, are also benefiting from North Korean military prowess and exports, the document says, noting that "the export of arms equipment is currently reckoned to be North Korea's most important source of income." To maintain this performance, the document says, the North Koreans increasingly depend on being able to import western goods and equipment. To this end they use a dense web of firms and offices, their roots going back to the 1970s. More than 30 of the named companies and institutions said to be involved in the North Korean arms procurement endeavour are in China and most of those are Chinese state firms or bodies.

Last week the US State Department slapped sanctions on six Chinese companies for their alleged supplies to Iran's military industries. The main market for the North Korean exports is the Middle East. "The most important buyers are Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Syria." Damascus, the document says, has been striving for self-sufficiency in its WMD efforts for years through substantial supplies of material and knowhow from Russia and through purchases in western Europe. Most surprisingly perhaps, the report says that Syria "has recently strengthened cooperation in the [arms] sector, particularly with Iran". The 55 pages list hundreds of companies and institutions from Pyongyang to Beijing to Sofia said to be in the WMD business, often using front companies in Dubai to disguise their true dealings. The aim is to "name and shame", to warn off EU companies from doing business with the listed organisations. What the intelligence assessment does not include are the names of the west European firms and scholars believed to be profiting handsomely from the trade in military knowhow and components. (The Guardian)

By Anonymous on Sunday, August 13, 2006 - 05:22 am:

N. Korea, Pakistan called world's top nuclear threats

Sunday, February 19 2006 • 06:16 PM Central Standard Time

Nuclear ProliferationStephen Speckman - Lecturer to say focus on Iran, Iraq leaves real perils untouched
There wasn't a real nuclear threat in Iraq, and there isn't one currently in Iran. Instead, two other countries and one man in particular are on the worry radar of weapon proliferation expert Joseph Cirincione. On Thursday Westminster College will host a lecture by Cirincione, director for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. His speech is titled, "Looking for weapons in all the wrong places: How we got it so wrong in Iraq and how we can get it right in Iran." North Korea has nuclear weapons. Pakistan has an unstable government, armed fundamentalist Islamic groups and material to build at least 30 nuclear weapons. And nuclear terrorism is as close as Osama bin Laden being able to get his hands on the enough of the right materials to build a bomb, according to Cirincione. "Those are the more urgent threats," he told the Deseret Morning News.

A question that lingers is why the United States and its allies aren't doing more to address those threats, Cirincione added. One answer is that so much attention in the Middle East these days is focused on overlapping agendas that include interest in oil, Israel and a regional transformation — starting with Iraq — into a more democratic society, according to Cirincione. "So far, the results have not been good," he said of the latter. The vision of a politically transformed Middle East, he said, is dying on the battlefield of Iraq and the process itself is proving more costly and complicated than anyone imagined. What people in this country still don't understand, Cirincione said, is that just prior to declaring war on Iraq, there was no intelligence that could confirm the presence of any weapons of mass destruction.

The intelligence assessment at the time, he added, did not determine the decision whether to go to war — it was the decision to go to war, Cirincione said, that determined what the intelligence assessment should be. "They saw Saddam as a threat that had to be removed," Cirincione said of senior officials in the Bush administration. The real threats Saddam Hussein did pose at the time, he added, were that he had a military force that was a threat to neighboring countries, that he could be a threat again to Israel and that he was already a threat to his own people. Now Iran's leader is rattling cages, but the country is still at least five years away from being able to enrich enough uranium and develop enough technology to produce nuclear weapons, according to Cirincione, who said he is worried about how heated the rhetoric is getting on both sides of this issue.

Complete article from Desert Morning News.

By Anonymous on Wednesday, November 09, 2005 - 11:37 pm:

You are lunatic and poorly informed and just another blind religious fanatic without any idea of world scene.
It is pointless to add anything to your foolish post.

By Anonymous on Wednesday, November 09, 2005 - 09:15 am:

Muhammad Azam Khan from Pakistan.

After reading the “The Origins of Dark Forces disguised as religious” this shows Indian's narrow thinking and hit ness with Pakistani and Muslim world whereas Pakistan always tried to make good bilateral relationship with the neighbors countries including India but Indian government, people’s (taking about only Hindu) does not want to make better relationship with the Muslim world (Pakistan) for instance Pakistan have good relationship with the all neighboring counties like China, Afghanistan, Iran and as well as also good relationship with the world like America, Saudi Arabia U.K, U.A.E. Europeans etc. my Indian Hindus friends if the Pakistani extremist dangerous for American so who can American government have good bilateral relationship with Pakistani government you people knows American’s government recently offering to sell their world greats fighter Aircraft F-16 to Pakistan. You also written that Muslim Omma killing Hindus so who can your thousands of Indian Hindus doing a job in Arab countries, please changed you thinking Islam is greatest religion in the world and the Pakistan have ability to gives the answer to any type of aggression.

You also written that “this time the threat is based on the most advanced technology and this extremely powerful technology is in hands of rough extremists” my friend this technology Pakistan have since 1980 but Pakistan not showing its whereas India first tested the nuclear boom and tired to under pursuer Pakistan therefore Pakistan had no other way to given the answer to India that Pakistan never impressed your nuclear test because Pakistan have more advance better and controlled nuclear technology (according to American & European reposts) Pakistan government have Control and Command System whereas Indian government does not have so far.

Anyhow Pakistani people to ready make good friendship Indian people if you want.

By Anonymous (144.92.164.204) on Saturday, March 22, 2003 - 07:52 am:

Poor Pakis. They have forgotten their roots, have become uneducated and are destroying themselves. Don't understand that the work that British started (of dividing a strong India) is still being carried out..that exlains their relation with the west now.

As someone said. Pakis don't know why they exist. They are allowing China to join the gang rape now. Well, wake up, work together with India and we can show how strong we can be.

Work is more imporatant than religion and so is education. Well, see if Pakistan is gaining in any of this? Unfortunately, their leaders cannot afford an educated population. Else people will understand their trick..Sad for the region.

But we do have to blame ourselves for dividing the country. People play games all the time, but fools will always be taken for a ride!! This is law of nature. So get educated and work hard to improve lives of your brothers on each side of the border then we can break this border.

Hopeful Indian (we we have nothing against Paki desis, just desire to help). Ghar ke jhagde mein bahar vale ka fayda hee hota hai!!

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